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A clear understanding of the impact of different types of taxes on
individual behaviour is necessary if taxes are to be designed to minimise
their negative impact on economic efficiency and equity. This is a major
motivation of optimal tax theory in economics. Furthermore, the intended
and actual impact of taxes will differ if the tax administration is not able to
counteract attempts by taxpayers to minimise the taxes they pay given
administratively complex taxes. One important dimension of individual
responses to taxes is the extent to which they willingly comply with tax
laws. Tax evasion and avoidance are major causes of deviation between
the actual and intended impact of taxes. Identifying administratively
simple taxes which provide limited opportunity for tax evasion and
avoidance is therefore also an important part of the agenda for tax
research in economics.
Before attempting to tackle normative tax design, it is important
to understand tax compliance behaviour. Towards this end, the
economic theory of taxpayer compliance behaviour with tax laws is
reviewed here. Given the likely importance of compliance costs on
compliance and given that this link has  not  been    sufficiently explored,
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particular attention is paid to the impact of compliance costs on
compliance. In fact, to illustrate how existing economic analysis of
compliance behaviour can be extended to additional determinants, the
extension to compliance costs is considered in detail.
The discussion proceeds as follows. First determinants of tax
compliance identified in the literature are reviewed. Next, basic economic
models of tax compliance and the impact of tax compliance costs on
individual behaviour are presented. This is followed by an exposition of
models which examine the link between the two. The analysis up to this
point assumes a given income subject to an income tax. An extension to
endogenously determined income from sales and simultaneous sales
and income taxes is then discussed to understand how compliance costs
of each tax have an impact on compliance with the other tax. In the
concluding section, brief comments are made on the implications of the
analysis for empirical analysis of the compliance, compliance cost link
and normative analysis of optimal taxes in the presence of non-
compliance.
II.Determinants of Tax Compliance:
 A Brief Review
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of tax
compliance by individuals.
1 The major impetus for tax compliance
research in economic theory is a seminal paper by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), with some important earlier exceptions. Before formally
presenting the Allingham and Sandmo (AS) model, determinants of tax
compliance are briefly reviewed.
As in all individual choice situations, there are two essential
elements which determine the final outcome of tax compliance choices
by individuals: What choices are feasible and what choices are
considered desirable by individuals.
2 As in much of neo-classical
analysis, amoral individuals are assumed to desire more income but to5
be risk averse. From this assumption it follows that individuals will not
comply with taxes unless non-compliance either lowers their real income
(by, say, decreasing the quantity of publicly provided goods) or increases
its riskiness.  The feasibility of different levels of non-compliance or,
more accurately, an individual's ability to get away with a given level of
non-compliance, is determined by the prevailing environment, particularly
tax administration effectiveness. This is captured, in the AS model and
many of its subsequent extensions, by the probability of punishment and
the penalty structure which together constitute a summary description of
the effectiveness of tax enforcement.
3 Both the probability and the
effective penalty are affected by corruption in tax administration.
However, in empirical research of tax compliance behaviour, besides
enforcement, several other important factors have been found to affect
tax compliance.
•  A key determinant of tax evasion, is the tax burden, particularly tax
rates or, more precisely, effective tax rates taking into account tax
concessions and exemptions. Though its impact is indeterminate in
the AS model, all empirical studies to date have found a negative
impact of the tax burden on tax compliance.
4
•  Financial development, particularly the extent of use of banking
channels for making payments, leads to income generating
transactions being easy to observe, reducing the scope for
transactions “off the books”. However, sophisticated financial
systems coupled with openness can make it easy for funds to cross
international borders to escape taxes.
 5
•  As the attractiveness of the formal sector  vis-a-vis the cash or
informal economy grows, voluntary compliance should also increase
due to the lower relative attractiveness of the cash economy.
6 A
successful program of structural adjustment, therefore, is likely to
result in increased compliance.
•  The ease with which evasion can be detected is linked with the
number of separate transactions that have to be detected to verify a
taxpayers taxable income. If development is associated with scale
economies in the size of transactions, this will tend to reduce non-
compliance.
7
•  Similarly, high industrial concentration implies fewer large taxpayers
in the economy allowing for better monitoring by the tax authorities.
86
•  The timing of tax liabilities relative to income earning is the basis of
the negative Tanzi-Olivera effect of inflation on effective tax rates
and so tax revenue. As discussed, high effective tax rates have an
impact on tax compliance.
9
•  This difference between the timing of income accrual and tax due on
income as also inexact provisions in the tax code, exemptions and
deductions, are the main determinants of tax avoidance which, in
turn, affects tax compliance. The existence of a well-developed
accounting profession and of tax preparers will also help tax
avoidance.
10
•  Research, primarily in the United States, suggests that what may be
termed "cultural" factors may significantly influence taxpayer
attitudes.
11 Included in this are such things as fiscal knowledge,
income and social class, risk aversion, race, age, sex, occupation,
peer attitudes to tax evasion and bribe payment, deference to
authority, and acquaintance with tax offenders.
•  Tax complexity also influences non-compliance by causing
misinterpretation of rules, omissions and unintentional errors besides
deliberate under-reporting.
12
•  The extent to which a taxpayer perceives that the government uses
taxes efficiently to provide a desirable mix of public goods has also
been found to affect taxpayer compliance.
13
•  The effect of higher compliance costs in promoting non-compliance
and improved taxpayer services in promoting compliance has also
been confirmed.
14
Most of the factors outlined above have implications for the
design of appropriate compliance policy. For example, the evidence
suggests that a polite and helpful tax administration and simplification of
tax forms could lower compliance costs and improve compliance at the
margin. To take another example, a high proportion of wasteful
government expenditure, which lowers the marginal benefit from
additional taxation is likely to promote non-compliance.
These factors can also be accommodated in extensions of the
basic AS model and their impact on compliance analysed. However, the
exposition of such a "complete" model would be of limited use. Instead,7
the basic economic model of tax evasion is now described followed, by
way of illustration, by an exposition of extensions to incorporate the
impact of tax compliance costs on taxpayer behaviour.
III. The Allingham-Sandmo Model
In the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) paper, an amoral
but risk averse taxpayer, with true income Y, chooses the fraction of
income to declare to tax authorities to maximize her expected utility of
income. The policy environment is given by the legally mandated income
tax function, T(Y), the penalty rate on detected but underpaid taxes, p,
and the probability of tax audit and detection, p.
15 For simplicity, we
assume a proportional tax function with tax rate t here. The fraction of
income reported voluntarily to tax authorities (or the level of compliance)
is denoted by x. The taxpayer’s decision problem can be written as:
x
MaxE(U) = (1-p)U[YN] + pU[YC] (1)
Where YN = Y – txY and YC  = Y - txY – (1+p)(1-x)tY represent,
respectively, net (after tax and penalty) income if evasion remains
undetected (Not caught) and is detected (Caught) by tax authorities. U[.]
is the  Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the taxpayer,
assumed to be strictly concave, implying risk aversion.
16 Utility is
assumed to depend only on after-tax income.
This model predicts that, provided the expected additional
payment on detection p(1+p)tY is below the tax due when income is
reported honestly (tY), the taxpayer will not comply fully, choosing to
report less than 100 percent of her income. However, there will be
greater compliance if there is stricter enforcement either by raising p or p.
In studies attempting to empirically verify the AS model, it has
been pointed out that since expected additional payments if evasion is
detected observed in practice are always less than taxes due, taxpayers
would always evade taxes if they behaved in accordance with the AS
model.
17 Tax evasion, however, is not resorted to by all taxpayers, in8
evidence from countries like the USA. This has prompted an enormous
number of extensions of the AS model over the past 30 years, leading to
the identification of many of the compliance determinants reviewed
above.
IV. The Impact of Compliance Costs in the
Absence of Non-Compliance
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998) describe a model of Slemrod
(1994b) which examines (monetary) voluntary compliance costs or
avoidance costs. In his model, avoidance reduces the tax base by S and
costs C. The scope for avoidance activity, as discussed, depends on the
existence of ambiguities and loopholes in the tax law and on the extent
of tax concessions. The model presented here is similar to that of
Slemrod (1994b) but omits a labour supply response in order to focus on
avoidance effects.
Net of tax income is given by Ya = Y – Tj – S, where S is
expenditure on avoidance (“Sheltering”) activity and Tj is the tax paid.
The tax function is assumed to have an exemption limit, V1/t1 and several
marginal tax brackets. Tj  = tjY – Vj, where Vj defines the income at which
the jth segment of the tax function would have cut the income axis in a
graph, in the absence of avoidance.
18 With avoidance Tj = [tj(1-ah(S))Y –
kS – Vj], where 0 £ k £ 1, and k is the fraction of S that is deductible from
the tax base. The term (1- ah(S)) represents the impact of avoidance
expenditure on taxable income. It is assumed that avoidance expenditure
is subject to diminishing returns or (using a prime for the first derivative
and a double prime for the second) that h(0) = 0, h' > 0,    h" < 0 and




  a is a “shift” parameter introduced to permit the
comparative static impact of greater avoidance opportunities to be
studied. Substituting for Tj into the expression for Ya gives:
Ya = Y[1-tj(1-ah(S))] – (1-tjk)S + Vj.         (2)9
Given the properties of h(.), Ya is maximized where the first order
condition for a maximum holds provided Y > Y* = max[V1/t1, (1-
t1k)S*/t1ah(S*)]. S* is the value at which income is at an interior
maximum, and t1 is the lowest marginal tax rate of the tax schedule. The
first order condition, which is given by
 ti[Yah' + k] = 1          (3)
states that tax savings from the marginal rupee spent on sheltering must
equal the rupee spent. Here,  ti £ tj is the post-sheltering marginal tax
rate.
There are two interesting predictions of this analysis. First, Y* is
the critical value of Y  below which avoidance expenditure will not be
undertaken. Whether or not there is actually no avoidance at low income
levels depends on the whether Y* exceeds or is below the tax threshold
(or exemption limit), V1/t1. A second prediction is that if there exists an
income level (Y*) above the threshold at which avoidance is optimally
undertaken, it will be optimal at all income levels above Y*.
Additional predictions can be obtained from comparative static
analysis of equation (3), the first order condition for S. Solving (3) gives
the function  S = S(b), where b = (1-tik)/tiaY  and where dS/db < 0. This
implies that  ¶S/¶t > 0,  ¶S/¶Y > 0 and  ¶S/¶k > 0 With respect to
compliance costs, ¶S/¶a > 0, if the marginal tax bracket is unchanged
implying that greater avoidance opportunities are, in fact, made use of by
taxpayers. The pattern of avoidance will, more generally, not be a
smooth function of Y, since jumps will occur when (1-ah(S*))Y –kS*
crosses the threshold of the next marginal tax bracket.
To summarise, the major predictions are that (i) low income
individuals are unlikely to find avoidance optimal, while (ii) avoidance
increases with income and with increasing avoidance opportunities. The
major policy suggestion from this analysis is the obvious one of closing
loopholes and reducing tax concessions.10
V. Mandatory Compliance Costs and
Tax Compliance
A simple extension of the AS model to allow for mandatory
compliance costs, is to assume that
YN = Y – txY – C(xY) – G  and (4)
         YC = Y – txY – C(xY)- G - (1+p)(1-x)tY.          (5)
The specification assumes a compliance cost function given by
C(xY)+G, where G ‡ 0 and C(xY) ‡ 0, C(0) = 0. C(xY) can be assumed to
be concave in line with the empirical finding in Chattopadhyay and Das-
Gupta (2002). The major conclusions emerging from an analysis of this
model are: (a) The minimum penalty necessary to deter non-compliance
is greater than in the absence of compliance costs since there are now
additional benefits from non-compliance. Consequently, the set of
taxpayers who declare zero income or do not file tax returns at all (the
latter implying that x = G = 0) will be greater than in the absence of
compliance costs. (b) For reported income between 0 and 100 percent of
true income (i.e. interior x), compliance decreases with both the level of
compliance costs and marginal compliance costs. To establish a proper
basis for empirical work it is, however, necessary to disaggregate
compliance costs into mandatory and voluntary costs.
VI. Mandatory Compliance Costs, Voluntary
Compliance Costs and Tax Compliance
The model above is now modified to incorporate tax evasion and
both avoidance and mandatory compliance costs, while retaining the
same notation. For simplicity, a proportional tax function, tY is assumed.11
The substantive difference between the model developed here and that
of Alm (1988) is in allowing for compulsory compliance requirements
besides the voluntary costs he examines.
19 It is assumed that compulsory
compliance costs have revenue benefits by increasing the probability of
detection and punishment of non-compliance. Other than this, the
standard AS model is used.
Non-compliance is assumed to be detected and punished with
probability p(M), where M is the compliance cost from compulsory
compliance requirements imposed on the taxpayer, assumed to be
deductible from gross income. Constant mandatory compliance costs are
assumed for simplicity. The implications of relaxing this assumption are
discussed after presenting the analysis with fixed M. Incomes after taxes
and penalties are now  given by:
YN = Y – S – M -TN   and  (6)
YC = Y – S – M – TN – F  (7)
depending on whether non-compliance is detected or not. TN denotes
taxes paid voluntarily and F denotes additional taxes and penalty if
evasion is detected:
TN = [(1-ah(S))(Y – M) – kS]xt ” qxt  (8)
F = qt(1-x)(1+p).  (9)
Expected government revenue is T = TN +pF, while expected after tax
income of the taxpayer is
E(Y) = Y – S – M – TN – pF = Y – S – M – T, As in the AS model, the
consumer maximises expected utility E(U) = (1-p)U[YN] + pU[YC].
However, besides x, there is now an additional choice variable, S. As in
the AS model, it is assumed that the probability of detection and
punishment of evasion (p) and the penalty rate (p) are not high enough
to deter evasion or that p(1+p) < 1. In the analysis here, attention to
interior solutions at which 1 > x > 0 and S > 0. The latter assumption may
not be satisfied at low levels of Y, as discussed earlier, so that, at low
income levels, the possibility of pure non-compliance (no avoidance)
arises.12
Under the assumptions made above, and using the notation UC ”
¶U/¶YC and hS ” dh/dS, the first order conditions for the choice of x and S
(which are sufficient here to guarantee a maximum) are:
ppUC = (1-p)UN  (10)
t[ahS(Y-M) + k] = 1.    (11)
The condition in (10) is identical to that in the simple AS model. If
M = 0, the condition in (11) is identical to that in (3), the optimality
condition for sheltering in the absence of tax non-compliance! The
implication is that the level of avoidance activity is independent of tax
evasion by an individual: While the evasion decision depends on the
level of avoidance chosen, feedback in the reverse direction is absent.
20
The taxpayer’s decision process may therefore be viewed as a two stage
process: First deciding on avoidance and then deciding on evasion,
given the amount of avoidance chosen. This property of the joint
avoidance-evasion model is of great help in empirical work, as measured
avoidance can be treated as a predetermined variable in empirically
modelling determinants of tax evasion.
21
Conditions (10) and (11) give rise to an optimal avoidance
function: S = S(k,Y,t,a,M), with avoidance increasing in k, Y, t, and a and
decreasing in M. The important result here is that other things equal,
voluntary compliance costs and mandatory compliance costs are
substitutes if mandatory compliance costs are tax deductible.
22  The
behaviour of reported income is more problematic. The optimal reported
income fraction is:
)] M , , k , t , Y ( S , p , M , , p , t , Y x[ x
? ? - + + + + - + - + + +
a a = (12)
Where the signs below parameters indicate signs of the partial
effects on x. Exogenous increases in enforcement variables (p,p) have
the same qualitative effects as in the AS model. However, other
determinants of compliance have (a) a direct effect and (b) an indirect
effect through their impact on avoidance costs. For Y, the sign of the
direct effect is indeterminate, but is positive with constant absolute risk
aversion.
23 The indirect effect through S can be ignored at low income
levels. Consequently,  non-compliance is likely to be increasing with
income at low incomes but will, in proportionate though not absolute13
terms, be moderated and may even decrease at higher income levels
(given concave compliance costs).  The effect of an increase in the
marginal tax rate, t, is indeterminate. For M, ignoring the induced effect
through the increase in the probability of detection, the impact is exactly
opposite to that of income.
24 Since the impact of an increased probability
of detection on non-compliance is negative, as in the AS model,  the
impact of mandatory compliance costs on compliance is likely to be
positive at low income levels, but may reduce compliance at high income
levels.
Further extension of the model, to allow the taxpayers to choose
the extent of compliance with mandatory requirements, is easily done but
yields no additional insights. Assume that (a) a penalty proportional to
the extent of non-compliance with mandatory requirements is applied if
the taxpayer is audited, but that (b) the increase in the probability of
detection from greater compliance with mandatory requirements exhibits
diminishing returns.
25 Diminishing returns to the government implies
increasing returns to non-compliance with mandatory requirements for
the taxpayer. Consequently, either full compliance with mandatory
requirements or full-non-compliance results. The latter case is that of
non-filers. In the former case, the model reduces to that analysed here. If
mandatory compliance costs also depend on declared income,
compliance with mandatory requirements is still zero-one, but other
model predictions are even more uncertain and context dependent. This
underlines the importance of empirical work in understanding the
compliance and compliance cost link.
The existence of tax withholding has not been taken into account
above. Withholding reduces the scope for non-compliance by salary
earners and others from whom taxes are withheld. The analysis of Yaniv
(1988) suggests that under-reporting of other income  not subject to
withholding (such as dividends in some countries, capital gains, and
some royalty and honorarium payments) increases in this situation.
Intuitively, since a chunk of income is no longer “at risk”, greater risks
can be taken with the rest of one’s income, while keeping overall risk and
expected income unaltered in comparison with the situation without tax
withholding.14
VII. Bribe Costs and Compliance
Mookherjee and Png (1995)
26 develop a theory of bribe paying
and tax evading taxpayers and tax officials who accept bribes. Bribes are
of two kinds. They are either beneficial to both parties (at the expense of
government revenue) or are a coercive extraction by officials. The latter
is a form of harassment. Both types of bribe costs have been found in
the survey of Indian income taxpayers described in Chattopadhyay and
Das-Gupta (2002). In the coercive case, bribe costs have effects similar
to mandatory compliance costs except that an increase in these costs
need not increase the probability of detection. For the former case,
Mookherjee and Png model the situation as a (simultaneous move)
game between a non-compliant taxpayer and a bribe accepting tax
official.
Taxpayers behave as in the AS model, except that they pay a
bribe if non-compliance is detected rather than getting penalised.
However, the maximum bribe they are willing to pay will not exceed extra
taxes and penalties they would have had to pay if they chose not to pay
a bribe. Tax officials, on the other hand, will not accept a bribe that is
lower than the expected cost to them if their bribe taking is detected by a
“vigilance” unit.
27 The equilibrium bribe is a fraction of the “surplus
available” or the difference between the maximum bribe the taxpayer will
pay and the minimum bribe acceptable to the tax official. Given this
equilibrium bribe rule, the (risk neutral) taxpayer chooses the level of
evasion and the (risk neutral) tax official, who prefers not to work other
thing equal, simultaneously chooses the work effort he puts in to detect
evasion. The probability of detection increases with additional effort. This
determines an equilibrium level of non-compliance and an equilibrium
bribe. The equilibrium bribe and equilibrium non-compliance turn out to
be positively related as would be expected, while tax revenue decreases
if non-compliance increases.15
VIII. More Than on Tax
Co-existence of sales (or excise) and income taxes is now
examined to assess to what extent estimates of cost of compliance with
one tax and its impact are affected by the existence of additional taxes.
Possible empirical problems arise from two sources: (a) in direct
estimates of compliance costs it may be difficult to separate out costs
associated with different taxes
28 and (b) compliance effects of
compliance requirements for both taxes may be affected by changes in
compliance requirements of either tax.
An assumption made here is that there is no exchange of
information between sales tax and income tax departments. However,
sales declared to the sales tax department are assumed to form the
basis of income declared to the income tax department so that, in the
taxpayer’s books, reported sales and reported income are consistent.
29
Attention is restricted to mandatory compliance requirements, assumed
to be exogenously given and fully complied with. There are now four
possible income levels:
Income when no evasion is detected = YN = R(Q) – H(Q) – M
– TN - TNS
Income when sales tax evasion is detected = YS = R(Q) – H(Q) – M
– TN - TNS - FS
Income when income tax evasion is detected  = YI = R(Q) – H(Q) – M
– TN - TNS - F
Income when both types of evasion are detected = YC = R(Q) – H(Q) – M
– TN - TNS – FS – F
R(Q) and H(Q) are respectively the net revenue and cost of producing
output, Q, with H(Q) being assumed to include sales tax compliance
costs (which are not deductible as, for example, in India). Income before
tax and income tax compliance costs, Y, is R(Q) – H(Q). The tax revenue
terms are:
TN = (Y- M - TNS)xt,   F = (Y – M – TNS)(1-x)t(1+p), TNS = R(Q)xStS and
FS = R(Q)(1 – xS)tS(1+pS). M is interpreted as including all compliance16
costs, including for sales taxes. The two types of compliance
requirements are distinguished in the model since only sales tax
compliance costs enter H(Q). The probability of detection of sales tax
evasion is q and, as before, the probability of detecting income tax
evasion is p.
30
Assuming interior evasion for both taxes, the three first order
conditions of the taxpayer (for Q, x and xS) are:
MR(1-tS) = MC  and
E(U') = p[(1-q)UI + qUC](1+p) = q[(1-p)US+pUC](1+pS) = 0.
In the equations above E(U') is the expected marginal utility of
income.  That the output decision does not depend on enforcement
parameters (given interior evasion) has been demonstrated in the
context of sales taxes alone by Marelli (1984). In addition, this analysis
suggests that, provided production remains profitable in the presence of
taxation, compliance costs do not further distort output decisions. The
major impact of compliance costs on output will be through its effect on
the viability of marginal firms. Further analysis of these equations shows
that increased compliance costs with either tax can affect both sales tax
and income tax compliance and that sign of the impact is indeterminate.
Consequently, when both taxes are present, the impact of compliance
costs on compliance behaviour cannot be predicted a priori.
Two additional points to note are, firstly, that, the base of actual
income taxes on business income is not economic profit (after sales tax)
but also the return to capital, as pointed out by Arnold  Harberger
(1962).
31 While this is important for empirical purposes, the
independence of the output decision from enforcement policy remains
unaffected with interior evasion. Secondly, the independence property
breaks down for price taking firms in zero profit equilibrium, thus making




Implications for empirical modelling: From equation (12) there
can be no a  priori sign expectation of the impact of mandatory
compliance requirements on compliance behaviour. Furthermore, in
empirical modelling, voluntary and mandatory costs need to be
separated out. However, as mandatory compliance costs may induce
non-filing behaviour, this suggests that empirical specifications will suffer
from a selection  bias problem in the absence of data on non-filers.
Unfortunately, since the nature of the specification bias depends on the
distribution of risk aversion in the population, there is little hope of
correcting this  bias by statistical means if data on non-filers are not
available. An additional requirement is to empirically distinguish
taxpayers who have taxes withheld and those who do not. For bribe
costs, a negative relation with compliance and tax revenue is to be
expected from the Mookherjee and Png analysis, though the potential
endogeneity of bribes has to be taken into account in choosing the
empirical estimation method.
The impact of compliance costs on tax revenue, T = TN + pF, can
also be studied directly in empirical work instead of first examining the
impact of compliance costs on compliance. Since
T =  T(Y, t,  p, p, x, S, M,  a, k) and since x and S are themselves
endogenous, no a  priori sign predictions on the impact of most
determinants emerge.
33
As will be clear, besides compliance cost, income and tax data,
data on effective penalty rates, factors influencing detection probabilities
and tax savings through avoidance are, ideally, needed.
Incorporating non-compliance and imperfect enforcement in
normative tax design research:   Extension of optimal tax theory to
incorporate non-compliance and imperfect tax enforcement requires two
other types of policy parameters to be considered, in addition to tax
schedules. These are the probability of detection and the penalty
schedule. A limited beginning has been made, for example in the work of
Chander and  Wilde (1992), and  Cremer and  Gavhari (1994, 1995,
1995a).  These analyses shows that some, though not all, of the tax18
design results of optimal tax theory in the absence of evasion and
enforcement continue to hold. One striking contrary finding, for example
in Chander and Wilde (1992), is that optimal income taxes should be
regressive in the presence of tax evasion. However, it is still too early for
practical policy to draw lessons from this research, given the rudimentary
modelling of the tax enforcement and the economic environment.
Furthermore, this research has yet to incorporate insights from parallel
research on the design of optimal penalties and enforcement.
34 A related
strand of research which is yet to be integrated into optimal tax design
work is into optimal organisation and incentive design for tax
administration.
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Das-Gupta, Lahiri, and Mookherjee (1995).
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and Mayo (1993), Erard and Feinstein (1994), and Hasseldine (2000). An
earlier study is by Dean, Keenan, and Kenny (1980).
12  See  Bolton (1987), and  Hasseldine (2000). The latter cites an example
from the UK where an attempt at simplification via a simplified tax return
for small taxpayers backfired as small traders under-reported their income
to reduce their compliance costs. This example shows that "simplification"
of tax forms may not always result in tax simplification!
13  See  Cowell and Gordon (1988),  Wallschutzky (1988),  Alm (1992),
Bordignon (1994), and Pommerehne, Hart and Frey (1994).
14  See  Alm (1988),  Hite (1989),  Mayshar (1991), Carroll (1992), Smith
(1992), Slemrod (1994), and Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a).20
                                                                                                                 
15  The original model assumed the penalty to be on undeclared income. The
modification of the penalty function considered here, which corresponds to
Indian law, is as in Yitzhaki (1974).
16  While the expected utility paradigm of choice under uncertainty underlying
the AS model is still used almost universally in economics, it suffers from
descriptive limitations. See, for example, Hogarth and Reder (1986). Till a
widely accepted alternative emerges, such as models based on prospect
theory developed by the 2002 Nobel Memorial  Prize winner, Daniel
Kahnemann, there is little choice. However, a pioneering attempt to use
prospect theory to analyse tax compliance is in Yaniv (1999).
17  The major studies are reviewed in Mookherjee (1989) and Andreoni et. al.
(1998).
18  This is the same as the exemption limit for the lowest marginal tax rate in
the tax schedule but will exceed it for higher pieces of piecewise linear tax
schedules, such as that prevailing for the personal income tax in India.
19  Mayshar (1991) also incorporates both avoidance time and involuntary
time compliance costs in his paper on taxpayer behaviour, allowing for
flexibility of labour supply and hence income. The model considers a
taxpayer  who derives utility from net income and  disutility from labour.
Income is derived from labour only and is given by  w[L – s – m(E)] –
T(w(L-s-m(E), S,E), where w is the wage rate, L is total labour hours, s is
hours spent on avoidance activity and m(E) is compliance time. E is a
vector of revenue instruments. The function  T(.) represents taxes paid
which depends on gross income, but also on avoidance and compliance.
The taxpayer chooses L and S to  maximize  U(Y,L). Unequivocal
predictions about compliance behaviour from this model are even more
limited than from the model presented here.
20  This result breaks down if the individual is reporting zero income  - i.e.
attempting to evade all taxes. This neutrality result is one of a series of
neutrality propositions in tax evasion theory, the first one concerning the
independence of the profit maximizing decision of a firm in the presence of
sales tax evasion, due to Massimo Marelli (1984). For the current problem,
this result is also in Alm (1988).
21  Furthermore, this is strengthened in India by tax deductions having to be
taken before the end of the financial year, while tax returns can be filed up
to 3 months ￿  more in recent years ￿ after the end of the financial year.




- = , the extent of substitution between S and M is
indeterminate, depending on the third derivative of h(S). A linear empirical
specification, implying perfect substitution is a reasonable first
approximation. Secondly, for salaried taxpayers in India, S is independent
of M since compliance expenses are not tax deductible separately but are
included in the standard deduction.21
                                                                                                                 
23  Using primes and double primes to denote first and second derivatives,
A(.) = -U"(.)/U' is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It is
generally thought that absolute risk aversion is decreasing (abbreviated
DARA) with income or at best constant (CARA). This implies that the
amount (not proportion) of income an individual is willing to risk in a
gamble, at favourable odds, is constant or increasing with income. In
particular, non-increasing absolute risk aversion here implies that  AN   ”
A(YN) £ AC ” A(YC).
24    The exact expression is
      
c U p
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q
s q
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dx ) )( x 1 )( h 1 ( p
+
p +
- a - - + - a - - = , where
      qS ” ¶q/¶S, is negative.
25  Assumption (a) is in line with Indian law.
26  A somewhat simplified exposition is in  Mookherjee (1997).
27  Mookherjee and Png also consider rewards to tax officials for detected
evasion. These are currently irrelevant for the Indian income tax.
28  See, for example, Sandford et. al. (1989).
29  Anecdotal evidence suggests that both these assumptions are realistic in
the Indian context.
30  Given the lack of effective coordination between indirect and income tax
administrations, p and q are assumed to be unrelated. This may not be
true in countries where there is effective  coordination between officials
administering both taxes.
31  Additional discussion of the incidence of the corporation tax is in Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1979).
32  An analysis of evasion by competitive firms and regulatory requirements
imposed on them is in Palda (2001).
33  The direct effect of increasing M or  a on revenue is negative due to
increased deductions (M) or decreased taxable income (a). The indirect
impact through changed avoidance is positive for increased M and
negative for increased a. However, no clear cut prediction emerges for the
impact through changed compliance behaviour.
34  See, for example Mookherjee and Png (1994), and Polinsky and Shavell
(2000).
35  See for example Mookherjee (1997).22
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